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Given the importance of urban public services in attracting
firm location, increasing employment and facilitating economic
growth, in this paper, we examine the following questions: Is there a
need for reforming public service delivery in Ludhiana (which is a city
chosen under India’s leading urban initiative), when judged against
national benchmarks? Is there a relationship between the city’s
financial performance and its delivery of urban services? We develop
several hypotheses. Next, we examine the potential bottlenecks to
reform in service delivery, and finally, the triggers for reform in
service delivery, if any. Several measures such as the growth of
population and land area, service delivery, and its current finances,
suggest a need for reforming public services in this city. We find the
general decline in the service level of water supply and sewerage in
the city could be attributed to a decline in its capital expenditures on
these services. Further, user charges do not adequately cover the
production costs of supplying water, or expenditures on sewerage.
The major bottlenecks to reforming public service delivery in this city
are financial and institutional, as they pertain to existing
arrangements for water, sewerage and landuse. Major triggers that
could make the reform happen in this city pertain to changes in
institutional arrangements for service delivery (privatisation) and
public participation, and finances (less of a trigger). Overall, the major
lessons for other cities and triggers that could make the reform
happen in Ludhiana pertain to changes in institutional arrangements
for service delivery, privatisation in service delivery, public
participation, and finances.
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Background
Urban areas contribute close to half of India’s GDP
highlighting their importance in achieving national growth targets.
Further, it is estimated that urban population in the country will
increase from 28 percent in 2001 to nearly 50 percent by 2020.  With
increasing population and demand for urban infrastructure services,
the capacities of local governments in many developing and newly
industrialised countries are over-burdened. The government of the
Republic of Korea estimates that infrastructure shortages result in a
GDP loss of as much as 16 percent of its potential in the mid-1990s
(see Singh and Ta’I, 2000). It is estimated that losses from traffic
jams in Bangkok range from US $272 million to US $1 billion, a year.
According to India’s Ministry of Urban Development (MUD), 20
percent of the country’s urban households are denied access to safe
drinking water, 58 percent do not have safe sanitation, and more than
40 percent of garbage generated is left uncollected for want of proper
waste management.
1 The importance, however, of public services
and infrastructure in attracting firm location, increasing employment
and facilitating economic growth, is well known (Sridhar, 2003);
Sridhar, 2006); Mani, Pargal and Huq (1996); Sahoo (2000)).
To address some of these issues and make cities engines of
growth, the Government of India (GoI), in its 2005 budget, initiated
the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) to
stimulate urban reform. The objectives of the JNNURM are integrated
development of infrastructure services in selected cities and planned
development of identified cities leading to urbanisation in a dispersed
manner. Ludhiana in the north Indian state of Punjab, is one of the 63
cities identified in the country, for possible funding under the
JNNURM. This case study focuses on this city’s urban services and
their reform, since it is representative of many growing cities in
developing economies and has lessons and implications for other
similar cities.6
Objective
Given the importance of urban public services in facilitating
national economic growth in developing economies, in this paper, I
examine the following questions: Is there a need for reform in public
service delivery in Ludhiana, when judged against national
benchmarks? Is there a relationship between the city’s financial
performance and its delivery of urban services? What are the
potential bottlenecks to reform in service delivery? Finally, what are
the triggers for reform in service delivery, if any?
The answers to these questions are critical for many
governmental policies as they relate to urban institutions and
finances. In India, the 74
th Constitutional Amendment Act (1992)
recognised urban local bodies (ULBs) as the third tier of government.
Despite this, after more than 13 years of this landmark development,
a majority of India’s cities continue to provide quite low levels of
urban services, as summarised by the MUD.
Further, city finances are in bad shape. Most of India’s cities
have now abolished the highly buoyant source of revenue, the octroi,
which is now generally accepted to be distortionary in its effects.
Further, the property tax base is at best subjective and has not yet
become a buoyant source of revenue. Under these circumstances,
cities in India can access the capital market (as was done by the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation nearly a decade ago). For
infrastructure needs, they will also be able to access funds under the
JNNURM. But if better finances are not going to improve service
delivery, then access to capital markets or the JNNURM or might not
make a difference to service delivery in India’s cities. While finances
are a critical factor underlying the delivery of any service, it is
important to understand whether finances are both a necessary and
sufficient condition for sustainable service delivery.
This paper is the outcome of research regarding service
delivery and urban management in Ludhiana, which can be used as
inputs for the JNNURM. The research can also be used as
benchmarks for assessing other cities’ public service delivery and for
understanding what could trigger the reforms there.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2, a brief
survey of literature regarding studies of urban public service delivery
is provided. Section 3 quickly describes the study hypotheses. Then7
the details of the case study follow from section 4. In the case study,
first, the demography and the economic base of Ludhiana, India, the
focus of the case study, are described, since they have implications
for consumption of various public services. Section 5 discusses the
actual status of various urban services, namely water supply,
sewerage and solid waste management, against certain norms and
benchmarks, and assesses their adequacy. Sections 5.2-5.4 contain
an analysis of whether there is a need for reforming service delivery
in the city, using measures, such as population, land area, traffic vis-
à-vis road density, and landuse that have impacts on service
delivery.  Next, finances and its relationship with service delivery, is
discussed in section 5.5. Section 6 explores any potential bottlenecks
to the reform process. Section 7 analyses possible triggers of the
reform process. The final section 8 summarises the findings,
implications for other cities and contains concluding remarks.
II.  Literature Review
While the literature on urban service delivery is vast, only
relevant studies are summarised here.
In his exploration of the relationship between the gross
domestic product and stock of infrastructural services in India, Sahoo
(2000) finds indeed that among all the sectors, electricity, gas, water
supply and communication sectors play a key role in explaining
movements in the GDP.
Given the importance of water supply, we find that a majority
of studies on urban public services focus on water supply since it is
the most important at the local level.
A study by the University of Birmingham (1999), based on
information from 35 urban centres in India, which represent 15
percent of India’s urban population, finds that private sector
participation is unlikely to have a significant impact on delivery of
public services such as water supply in the medium term, because of
too many vested interests in the existing institutional patterns. That
research suggests that until there is demand for institutional
development from municipalities, which is, in turn, generated by
demand for better service from customers, there can be no
sustainable advances in service delivery.8
Expansion and improvement of public services is essential to
improving the quality of life and productivity in all developing
countries. Fox and Edmiston (2000) find how some African countries
have been diligent in expanding the infrastructure necessary to
provide public services, but unfortunately, most have not done a very
good job of paying for them. Fox and Edmiston present a case study
of water supply services in Egypt, where they emphasise the
importance of user charges to enable expansion of coverage of water
supply services.
Based on survey data from Lagos, Reedy (1986) found that
many participants did not have access to public water supply
because the supply authority could not afford to expand service
delivery. As Fox and Edmiston (2000) point out, water charges are a
sustainable way to increase affordability of the local governments to
do this because taxes or intergovernmental revenues are less likely
to provide a consistent funding source as competing uses can
diminish available resources.
There are several studies of urban service delivery in cities of
India. Sridhar, Mathur, and Nandy (2006) examine whether the
solution to better public service delivery in India’s cities should be to
close cities to migration, or correct the under-pricing of services. In
the case of essential public services such as water, it is generally
accepted that it is not fair to recover capital costs. However, as
Williamson (1988) points out, there is a reason why marginal, not
average costs, should be the basis for pricing of water supply. A city
usually develops its least expensive water sources first, but it
normally becomes increasingly expensive to produce an additional
unit of water as demand grows with increasing migration into the
urban area. In such an instance, using the average cost of today
would lead to an underestimation of the cost of water production in
the future, so only marginal costs reflect the true cost of providing the
service. Sridhar, Mathur, and Nandy (2006) estimate the marginal
costs of providing water supply in several of India’s cities and find
that a few large (million-plus) cities are indeed under-pricing their
water, so closing the cities to migration to firms or households might
not be the solution. They find that the marginal operating cost of
providing one kilolitre of water based on several of India’s cities
ranges from $0.06 to $0.11, and that several large cities are
undercharging their water, based on these marginal cost estimates.
Rao and Agarwal (1991) provide a methodology to estimate unit
costs of public services and expenditure needs in the Indian states,
based on the cost functions of five public services. They find, based
on their state-level analysis, that in order to ensure even average9
levels of the five services they examine – administrative services,
police services, primary education, secondary education, and public
health—a sizeable increase in transfers to poorer states would be
required.
Zérah (2002) reports findings from a household survey in
Vijayawada (a city with 2001 population of 800,000 in Andhra
Pradesh, India), whose objectives were to determine the level of
service provided by the (Vijayawada) Municipal Corporation, assess
the existing household coping strategies, evaluate the cost of water
supply and sanitation and measure the level of satisfaction of the
inhabitants of the city. That survey indicated that 77 percent of the
households considered water to be cheap or very cheap. In the
project zone, in the case of connection and monthly charges, the
study found that household willingness to pay was, in fact, more than
one and a half the average, testifying for the sustainability of water
charges as a means of financing investment in the area.
Raju, Praveen, and Anand (2004) make an attempt to
understand the resources and management constraints in providing
adequate and safe drinking water supplies in a medium sized city in
the southern part of India, Kolar, in Karnataka. They find that a)
though 66 percent of the city’s households had piped water supply,
68 percent of them had unauthorised connections, thus depriving the
exchequer of its revenue; b) the per capita supply was only one-third
of the urban water supply norms; and c) the entire city supplies were
based on groundwater, which was quite contaminated with high
nitrate and fluoride contents, because of which the households had to
depend on more expensive private water providers for drinking water.
Most of the households were forced to spend $2.26-$11.28 [or INR
(Indian Rupees) 100-500]
2 per month for drinking water, while the
public water fee was just $1.02 (INR 45) per house per month. The
study demonstrates how local government apathy often creates not a
very optimal situation for the public in the case of water.
In addition to the needs of expanding coverage, investment
is also required for basic services to be environmentally sustainable.
The Urban Water Council (UWC) of the United States Conference of
Mayors (2000) points to recent estimates by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) of capital investment trends and current
investment needs for sustainability. The EPA made a rough
projection that if the nation's cities were to meet the requirements of
the Clean Water Act, they would need to increase capital spending
by 5 percent each year for the next two decades.10
The literature reviewed here thus conclusively shows the
need for government in overseeing the provision of basic services,
and that privatisation is not a panacea. Further, existing studies
confirm that user charges greatly enable the provision of sustainable
level of public services such as water supply, taking into account the
investment needs required in developing countries to expand
coverage.
This case study adds to this literature by focusing on the
issue of reforming local public services, and examines the
bottlenecks and triggers of such reform, something which has not
been explored much in the literature, despite the wave of
decentralisation that has swept across the globe. The answers to
questions—the need for reforming service delivery, relationship
between finances and service delivery, bottlenecks to and triggers of
reform in service delivery, have implications that can serve as input
for urban initiatives such as the JNNURM, and for service delivery
reform in cities in many developing countries that are reeling under
the negative impact of poor public services and are similar to
Ludhiana in many substantive senses.
III.  Study Hypotheses
This particular case study looks at the critical questions in
reforming service delivery—its relationship with city-level finances,
bottlenecks for and triggers of reform, based on an examination of a
city’s service delivery and finances. There are certain hypotheses
that we might a priori test.
First, higher capital rather than revenue expenditures should
imply better service delivery. Cities that spend relatively more on
establishment, and salaries, when compared with capital
expenditures (developmental work), are likely to be inefficient, hence
unable to provide a desired level of the service. In theory, capital
expenditures may be viewed as providing pure or impure public
goods (e.g., water, street lights) whereas revenue expenditures
(while indirectly facilitating the provision of public goods), most
directly provide private goods such as office equipment, wages, and
salaries.
Second, financial self-reliance does not imply much for
service delivery. That is, a city might not be overly dependent on11
state transfers and grants, but such financial independence does not
imply the city is self-reliant in terms of service delivery, or is providing
an adequate level of the service.
The third hypothesis follows from the literature we have
reviewed (e.g., Fox and Edmiston (2000); Sridhar, Mathur, and
Nandy (2006)). Cities in which user charges reflect the unit or
marginal costs of providing services are able to deliver a more
adequate level of the service, when compared to cities where such
costs are not covered.
Finally, even if finances are important in service delivery
outcomes, it is likely that other factors such as institutional
arrangements are likely to impact service delivery (as both
bottlenecks and triggers to reform), in the context of countries with
multiple tiers of government.
An examination of these hypotheses will enable to dispel
myths about service delivery and finances. If it were found that
finances do not affect service delivery, further examination should
enable us to focus on other aspects of service delivery. Alternatively,
even if finances are important in determining service delivery
outcomes, the hypotheses will enable to throw light on other factors
that might be equally important in service delivery. Thus the case
study makes an attempt to offer a holistic view of reforms in the
delivery of important urban services, in the context of growing and
emerging economies.
IV. Case Study of Ludhiana, India
In the case study, first the economic base and demography
of the city are described since they have direct implications for the
consumption and needs of various public services.
4.1 Economic Base and Demography
Ludhiana, the largest city and the only metropolis of Punjab
and the youngest metropolis of India as per the 1991 census of India,
is located 95 kilometre north of Chandigarh, and 300 kilometre
northwest of New Delhi. Ludhiana is strategically located in the12
middle of Punjab, and offers access to Amritsar from Delhi. It acts as
a corridor between Punjab and the rest of the country for transport of
agricultural and industrial products. The city is well known for its
industrial growth and is frequently called as the Manchester of India.
There is considerable industrial activity in the city consisting of
cycles, machine tools including sewing machinery, auto spare parts,
and hosiery units. Ludhiana produces a large number of bicycles,
Hero, and Avon, being the most popular brands. In hosiery, the city is
exporter to Russia, Europe, and other parts of the world.
4.1.1 Demography
Ludhiana is one of the three municipal corporations in Punjab
with its 2001 census population of 13,98,467, out of which 56 percent
are male, the remaining being female (with this gender proportion
having remained roughly constant over 1991-2001). The Ludhiana
Municipal Corporation (LMC) covers a total area of 135 square
kilometre yielding a 1991 density of 7,743 per square kilometre, and
a 2001 population density of 8,775 per square kilometre (for an area
of 159 square kilometre). The population density of the MC increased
from roughly 5,519 per square kilometre in 1981 to 7,743 in 1991.
The inner part of the city is, of course, more densely populated (500
persons per hectare or 50,000 per square kilometre) than the outlying
areas (that has density of 80 persons per hectare or 8,000 per
square kilometre) in some places.
The population density of the district for 2000-01, 804
persons per square kilometer, was also the highest of all districts in
the state of Punjab, when compared to the state average of 482.3 per
square kilometre. This shows the need for cautious land
management in LMC to optimise city efficiencies.
The annual growth rate of Ludhiana (the city)’s population
over 1991-2001 was 2.9 percent, higher than India’s national average
for the growth rate of urban population over this period, 2.7 percent.
This somewhat supports the notion that we are looking at a relatively
well-performing city, since population is usually attracted by what it
perceives to be better economic opportunity in any given area.
Along with the rapid increase in its population, the city has
also witnessed tremendous expansion in its area recently. In 1981,
the municipal area was 110 square kilometre which increased to
134.67 square kilometre in 1991. More recently, the city has
expanded in all directions mostly along its radial road corridors. The
most recent extension of the MC limits took place on November 13,13
1995, which now occupies an area of 159.37 square kilometre.
Increases in spatial expansion, as with increases in population, have
implications for stepping up provision of various services such as
water supply, sewerage, and sanitation.
Literacy rate is quite high in Ludhiana, being 80 percent in
2001, well above the national average of 65 percent. The district’s
literacy rate, being 76.5 percent in 2000-01, was also well above the
state’s average of 70 percent for that year. This is despite the fact
that the city is characterised by migratory labour from neighboring
states who work in various industries of the city as unskilled labour
and are frequently illiterate.
Data from India’s 2001 census show that Ludhiana’s slum
population of 18.45 percent is relatively large when compared to
other Indian cities that are similar in size (Bhopal, 6.27%, Patna
(0.13%), and Vadodara (5.63%)).
4.1.2 Economic base
Non-workers or those outside of the labour force constituted
two-thirds of the population of the city in 1991, with one-third of
population engaged actively in the labour market, more or less an
identical trend over 1981-91. By 2001, the city’s workforce
participation rate had increased from one-third to 37 percent. In 1991,
in fact, workers constituted 54 percent of those in the age group 15-
60 years (active labour force age group), much higher than the 41
percent national work force participation rate (workers as a proportion
of total population) for 2001.
There has been a decline over time in the city’s proportion
employed in household industry, manufacturing and processing
industry. In 1991, of the one-third employed, roughly half were
employed in manufacturing and processing other than household
industry. Further, another 40 percent of those employed were in
construction, transport, storage, communication, trade and
commerce, and other services in 1991.
3
There are a large number of small, medium and large firms in
Ludhiana (district)
4 that contribute to total employment and output.
Table 1 shows this for 1996 and 2003. While the data shown in Table
1 are cumulative, they indicate that small-scale firms in the district
accounted for nearly all (99% of) the firms established during 1996
and 2003. These small units accounted for 85 percent of all
employment created in 1996, and 78 percent of jobs in 2003. They14
accounted, however, for a little greater than 40 percent of total
investment and production in 1996, and only 22 percent of
investment in 2003, consistent with the well-known fact that small-
scale units are labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive.
In 1996-97, sales tax collections from Ludhiana (city)
amounted to $54.06 million (INR 2,396,200,000) constituting 19
percent of the total sales tax revenue of the state of Punjab. This is
one measure of its overall contribution to economic activity in the
state.
5
There were no marginal workers in Ludhiana in 1991. This
means that there were none that were actively looking for work that
did not find any. Marginal workers, according to the census of India,
are those who worked for sometime in the year (less than 183 days
or six months) preceding the enumeration, but did not work for a
major part of the year. This corroborates the idea of the city being a
labour-short area, and being able to absorb and provide jobs to a
large number of in-migrants from other areas within and outside the
state. However by 2001, marginal workers in Ludhiana (Municipal
Corporation) constituted nearly 50 percent of total workers, implying
that the supply of workers was continually increasing.
Table 1: Industry in Ludhiana (District)
Small scale units* Medium and large units
1996 2003 1996 2003
Number of units 26,440 42,704 88 168
Investment (million $) 111 252 157 881
Employment 1,93,220 2,73,593 35,000 75,185
Production (million $) 596 1,855 789 NA
Source: District Industries Centre, Ludhiana
*According to the Ministry of Small Scale Industries, Government of India, a
small  scale industrial unit is an    industrial undertaking in which investment
in fixed assets in plant and machinery does not exceed Indian rupees (INR)
10 million or $225,631.77, based on the exchange rate of $1 = INR 44.32,
prevailing when this paper was first written in October 2005).
Consistent with this, the 1991 census reports total in-
migration of 250,711 (from all age groups and durations of residence
less than 10 years) over 1981-91 (that accounted for 24% of the
city’s population in 1991) into the LMC limits.
6  Historically also, the
census data show that migrants typically came from other states
within the country mostly from poorer, high unemployment states
such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and geographically nearer states such
as Haryana. The 1991 migration data show that roughly 25 percent of
the total migrants to Ludhiana did so seeking employment. Further,15
the data on migration by age into the city show that roughly 40
percent of the migrants were below 30 years of age, quite conducive
for the absorptive capacity of the city’s labour market.
The city’s economic base has implications for various civic
services. While the hosiery industry is water-intensive (dyeing), it also
is quite polluting. Further, basic knowledge of the inputs and
processes of the bicycle, sewing machine and auto spare parts
industry demonstrate the need for disposal of waste rubber and scrap
metal.
V.  Need for Reform in Service Delivery
The need, if any, for reforming service delivery in Ludhiana
was assessed on the basis of the actual state of service delivery for
important services such as water supply, sewerage, and solid waste,
followed by an examination of various outcome measures such as
growth of population and land area, traffic vis-à-vis road density,
composition of landuse that impinge on the delivery of various
services, and the city’s finances.
5.1 Service Delivery
5.1.1 Water supply
The main source of water supply in the city of Ludhiana is
underground water, which is drawn through shallow and deep tube
wells. The institutional arrangement for providing water supply is that
while the Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board (PWSSB),
which is a parastatal agency, undertakes the planning, development
and construction of major water and sewer networks, the operation,
maintenance and the execution of minor developmental works is
provided by the municipality (LMC).
The service level statistics for water supply in Ludhiana are
summarised in Table 2. Hundred percent of the municipal areas have
the capacity to provide water to the entire population, but, overall,
only 80 percent have access to piped water supply (Table 2). This
implies that despite the fact that there is no infrastructure constraint,
the coverage with piped water supply is not complete in the city. It is
likely that for the remaining 20 percent of the city, lack of affordability16
of the population has prevented them from having access to piped
water supply.
Table 2: Service Level Statistics for Water Supply, Ludhiana, 2003
Description of service Number or
percentage
covered
Population as per 2001 1440000
Population in 2003 1517000
Total number of houses (2003) 316042
Average number of people per household 4.8
Population having access to piped water supply 1213600
In percentage 80
Population served by household connections 658000
Population served by stand-posts 18000
Population served by independent institutional
Setup (engineering colleges, universities,
Commercial and industrial establishments)
72000
Total population served 748000
Total number of private houses with
Metered connection
0






Total number of house connections 137071
Total number of commercial connections 25663
Number of stand posts 350
Number of tubewells 347




Total length of distribution line (mains and sub-
mains) in km.
1467
Source: Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board (PWSSB), 2003.
None of the private houses have metered water connections,
which has implications for water usage. As there is no volumetric
consumptive tariff regime, the customers in these locales are
generally not concerned about water loss.
When the access of households to water supply in urban
Punjab (the state in which Ludhiana is located) and urban India is
compared with that for Ludhiana, the city has above average (state
as well as national) access, called for by its higher population
density. The data reported in Table 3 for all three entities (Urban17
Punjab, Urban India and LMC) is from India’s census, and is
presented for purposes of comparing the data obtained from local
sources. The data presented for LMC in Table 3 from the census
2001, must have been collected at least a couple of years earlier, so
that is actual data of 1998 or 1999. Data from the PWSSB in Table 2
are local, and recent, being of 2003. So while census data show 69.5
percent tap water supply access in LMC, more recent data from
PWSSB show 80 percent access of population to piped water supply
in LMC. The actual access of population to piped water supply in
LMC is likely to be in the range of 70-75 percent.
Table 3: Access of Households to Water Supply and Toilet Facilities


























Ludhiana M.Corp 98.52 92.43 69.50 65.81 94.88 83.27
Punjab (Urban) 98.88 91.70 66.81 63.44 86.52 82.76
India (Urban) 90.01 60.84 68.66 49.68 73.72 57.38
Source: Census of India, 2001.
While being above average when compared to the state and
that for the country as a whole (Table 3), it is debatable whether the
level of water supply is adequate in LMC, when compared against
benchmarks. The city’s population density has also been above
average so far (see Figure 1 in section 5.2). If we take into account
the projections we have made for its population density, making
various assumptions (see Figure 2, section 5.2), there is no room for
complacency.
Table 4 shows the compilation of facts as they pertain to
water supply. According to the PWSSB, actual average daily
production of water in LMC is 284 MLD (million litre daily), out of
which only 140.5 MLD is charged. Only 137 MLD is consumed
through house connections in the city. The 137 MLD accounts for a
mere 98 LPCD (litre per capita daily), which implies water supply of
only about 8-10 hours (Table 4) a day. The lack of continuous supply
is due to the fact that ground water has to be pumped up through
tubewells and power is a constraint for this. Further, there could be
seasonal variations in the supply, about which data were not
available from the PWSSB.18
Table 4: Statistics for Water Supply, Ludhiana, 2003.
Description of service Level
Actual average daily production of water (MLD) 284
Total average daily water discharge capacity (MLD) 454
Daily water consumption through house connections (MLD) 137
Daily water consumption through handposts (MLD) 3.5
Total average daily water charged (MLD) 140.5
 Percent of water unaccounted for 50.5
Daily water supply duration (hrs.) 8-10
Source: Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board, 2003.
The ideal norms for water supply vary greatly across cities
and are based on considerations of industrial use, public use, fire
demand, and losses in transmission, according to the oldest
committee on urban services, the Zakaria Committee (1963). This
committee, examining various norms for urban infrastructure
services, specifies certain considerations to be taken into account in
the development of norms for water supply, as with other services. It
recommends a service level target of 150 LPCD for piped water
supply with sewerage (70 LPCD without sewerage), which includes
roughly 20 percent wastage of water.
While the average daily production of water (284 MLD) in
Ludhiana accounts for 203 LPCD of water, the actual supply
consumed in the city being 98 LPCD, is highly inadequate taking into
account the national ideal supply standard of 135 LPCD or 175
LPCD, taking into account distribution losses, recommended by
India’s National Commission on Urbanisation, or the 150 LPCD
recommended by the Zakaria Committee for cities with piped water
supply systems with sewerage.
5.1.2 Sewerage
While the Zakaria Committee recommends that for large
urban centres (such as LMC), the service level target should be full
coverage by sewerage with treatment, a formal sewerage system
exists in only half the city’s area. Sewage treatment plants are non-
existent in the city, with the collected sewage being discharged into
the local stream. In the rest of the city, sewage is conveyed in
rudimentary open shallow drains and ditches, which are close to the
living quarters of the residents, being discharged into the ground or
the nearest water body. This leads to contamination of the water
supply network and also pollutes the aquifer, which serves as a
source of the city’s water.19
As a norm, 70 percent of water provided for domestic
purposes (284 MLD, Table 4) finds its way into the environment as
wastewater. This means that a total of 200 MLD is generated as
wastewater. Of this, about 150 MLD of sewage is discharged into the
city’s environment from domestic sources and about 50 MLD, from
industries and other sources. This is likely to increase as the water
supply increases with the commissioning of the water supply
augmentation project.
Table 5 summarises the level of service for sewerage. It may
be noted that only 55 percent of the city’s population have access to
sewerage connection, much less than the coverage for water supply.
At present only 10 percent of the city is covered by storm water
drainage facilities, primarily because it is expensive. Given that the
Zakaria Committee recommends 100 percent city area to be covered
by sewerage system with treatment facilities in large urban centres,
the extent of sewerage access in LMC is highly inadequate.
Table 5: Service Level Statistics for Sewerage System, Ludhiana, 2003




Population access to sewerage in numbers 834350
In percentage 55
Population served through sewer house connection in (numbers) 585928
Population served through soakage pits/ septic tanks (in
numbers)
849072
Population served by independent institutional sewage (own
systems in universities, colleges and so forth)
(in numbers)
72000
Population served through conservancy system (in numbers) 10000
Actual number of sewer connections 121985
Number of institutions having independent sewerage system 22
Total average daily sewage flow in MLD 292
Length of outfall sewer (in kilometre) 8
Length of intercepting sewer (in kilometre) 96
Length of lateral/branch sewer (in kilometre) 964
Total length of sewer (in kilometre) 1098
Source: Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board, 2003.
5.1.3 Solid waste management
Ludhiana produces a high volume of solid waste. While most
Indian cities generate garbage in the range of 200 to 500 grams per
capita per day, in the year 2000-01, LMC’s generation of waste was
about 420 gram per capita per day. About 70 percent of garbage and20
waste is collected and disposed off every day. The total area of the
LMC is 159.37 square kilometre. Out of this, the older part of the city
covering approximately 40 percent of the area and comprising 50
percent of the population is being served by scavenging and
sanitation facilities. Fifty percent of the population living in the outer
areas is deprived of these facilities.
Various committees (including the Zakaria Committee) have
laid down the minimum physical standard of services to be 100
percent collection and disposal of solid wastes. Further, Mohan
(1996) finds that on average, the solid waste efficiency was 83
percent for class 1 cities in India.
7 Given this, the question arises as
to why the collection efficiency is only 70 percent in LMC. This shows
the need for increasing the solid waste collection efficiencies and its
management in the city.
5.2 Growth of Population Density and Projections
Given the actual state of various essential services, consider
the growth of population that most critically determines the demand
for these services in the near future. The population density of LMC
has been consistently higher than that for the state and national
urban population and has been continually increasing post-1981.
Figure 1 shows this. This represents the need for increasing levels of
all urban services.
Source: Census of India
Next, we projected population density for LMC, assuming its
own growth rate (historical growth rate and recent trends), the state’s
urban growth rate, and the national (urban) growth rate. Figure 2
shows the actual and projected population density. In Figure 2, the
Figure 1


































































trend shown over 1970-2000 is actual LMC population density. We
projected population density for 2010 and 2020, making four different
assumptions. In case LMC’s future population density follows its own
historical rate, or Punjab’s urban growth rate of population density
(both of which are declining), there is no imminent threat regarding
service levels. However, if it follows its own recent trends (i.e.,
average growth of LMC’s population density in the past two decades,
1981-91 and 1991-2001), or the country’s average growth rate for
urban areas, there is an imminent need to increase levels of all urban
services such as water supply, sanitation, sewerage, urban roads, to
meet the increasing burden imposed by rising population density.
5.3 Traffic vis-à-vis Road Density
An examination of road and traffic densities displays the
need for changing patterns of landuse in this city, which promises to
be the biggest problem in India’s cities, for many years to come.
When juxtaposed with population density, the density of roads in
Ludhiana district (not available for the city) was 1.08 per square
kilometre in 1999-00, (decreasing from 1.58 per square kilometre
during 1996-97), compared to only 0.87 per square kilometre for the
state in 1999-00.  While being above the state average, the
inadequate road network in relation to population density and
unbalanced spatial distribution of urban activities in the district pose
special problems of accessibility. The low percentage of land to roads
indicates narrow right of ways resulting in low levels of the service.
Most of the “through” traffic passes through the city centre owing to
lack of peripheral on ring roads.
The vehicle density in the district is also very high, being 162
per square kilometre for 1999-00, compared with only 54 per square
kilometre for the state for that year.
Part of the reason for this is that the district has the highest
number of motor vehicles registered, 608,780 as of 1999-00, of all
districts in the state. This indicates the inadequacy of the road
infrastructure relative to vehicles in the district more generally.22
Source: Census of India, and Author’s Projections
Table 6 shows the number of different types of motor
vehicles on the road in Ludhiana (district) during 1993-94.  Based on
this data, the total number of vehicles per capita for the district turns
out to be 0.26, compared to 0.10 for the state of Punjab for 1991,
again reinforcing the need for vehicle space.
Based on the above problems, the city needs to enforce plan
more carefully for landuse in its comprehensive traffic and
transportation plan. The next section contains details of the city’s
current landuse patterns.
Table 6: Vehicles on Road in Ludhiana
Type of vehicle Number on the Road
Buses 537










Source: Statistical Abstract of Punjab, 1997
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Table 7 compares the disaggregated landuse of Ludhiana for
2000 and 2003. A quick comparison shows that the area zoned for
residential use, although declining, forms the bulk of landuse in the
city. Further, there is a perceptible increase in land devoted for traffic
and transportation, reflecting the city’s response to the growth of
traffic and congestion problems.







Residential 14540 49.20 12570 42.3
Commercial 2086 7.06 1867 6.30
Industrial 5353 18.12 5560 18.73
Recreational 120 0.41 538 1.80
Traffic and Transportation 4724 16.00 6046 20.35
Utilities 60 0.20 65 0.22
Government 610 2.06 650 2.20
Public and Semi Public 2055 6.95 2406 8.10
Total built-up area 29548 100 29702 100
  Source: Draft Master Plan, Ludhiana 2000-2021
5.5 Finances
While the state of the various services emphasises the need
for reform, we test the various hypotheses raised at the beginning of
the case study, based on a study of Ludhiana’s finances.
First, take the hypothesis that higher capital rather than
revenue expenditures imply better service delivery. The bulk of
LMC’s total expenditure (75 percent of it) on water supply and
sewerage, indeed, constitutes revenue expenditure. This refers to
establishment (office furniture, administration, equipment, and so
forth) and operation and maintenance (O&M) expenses that
respectively constituted 27 and 47 percent of total expenditure in
2003-04. In revenue expenditure, O&M expenses have overtaken
expenditure on salaries since 2001-02. Therefore, only a small part of
the total expenditure on water and sewer (roughly 20 to 22 percent)
is being spent on developmental works and investment in assets
(e.g., installation of hand pump). The exceptions were 1999 and 2000
when 45 percent of total expenditure was on developmental work.
Capital expenditure accounted for 26 percent of total expenditure in
1997-98, and increased to only 29 percent of total expenditure in
2003-04.24
Figure 3 shows over time the expenditure on water and
sewerage by category. The figure shows that although total
expenditure on water and sewerage showed a continual increase
since 1997-98, capital expenditure declined since 2000-01, whereas
establishment and salary expenditures continually increased. O&M
expenses remained more or less constant. The only exception was
expenditure on electricity for operating tubewells that registered an
increase since 2000-01. Debt repayments increased since 2000-01,
reflecting repayments towards a loan (discussed in the section on
debt).
Source: LMC
Figure 4 shows a comparison of trends in the LMC’s total
expenditure on all services including water and sewerage (in per
capita constant prices) over time. This picture shows that total
expenditure on all services has fallen since 2000-01, consistent with
its income trends (Figure 6). Further, expenditure on establishment
and salaries, operation and maintenance works have remained the
same over 2000-01 to 2003-04, whereas capital expenditure has
declined significantly over the period. In general, capital expenditure
on services has not kept pace with the rapid population growth
summarised in Figure 1.



































We find that revenue expenditure is the primary component
that drives total expenditure, the primary drivers being salaries
followed by O&M (Figure 4). Wages and salaries increased in
absolute terms over this period because they are indexed to inflation.
They declined as proportion of total expenditure, which is likely due
to various outsourcing attempts made for the provision of various
services during 1998-2001. As is well known, government
recruitment is costly (higher wages and compensation for workers of
lower levels of skills), when compared to the market.
   A similar trend holds good for general expenditure apart from
water and sewer. A majority of the general budget of LMC has
traditionally been spent on revenue items such as administration,
salaries, and O&M.
Figure 5 shows the general budget’s expenditure on various
services (apart from water and sewer) over time. It demonstrates a
decline in expenditure on all important civic services – including
health, sanitation, roads, streets, and drains, street lights, new
developmental works, and O&M over the period 2000-01 to 2003-04.
The only exception is electricity for street lighting that showed a
continual increase in expenditure over the period 1997-98 to 2003-
04, and establishment expenditure.
Figure 4














Overall, capital expenditure and expenditure on
developmental works continue to constitute less than 30 percent of
total expenditure, a case of capital expenditure not growing fast
enough to keep pace with population growth.
What do these expenditures mean for service levels? Table 8
summarises the trends in the service levels of various aspects of
water supply over 1996-2003. Consistent with the expenditure trends,
there has been a constant increase in the percentage of unaccounted
for water, and decrease in the average daily water charged, since
2000-01, when the capital expenditures also started declining.
Further, since 2000-01, there has been a decrease in the daily water
supply duration from 12 to 10 hours. The daily water consumption
through house connections has also registered a decline since 2000-
01, as summarised in Table 8. All these findings lend support to the
hypothesis that the general decline in the service level could be
attributed to a decline in capital expenditures, post 2000-01.
Figure 5




















                            Table 8: Trends in Water Supply, Ludhiana Municipal Corporation
Description 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Actual average daily
production of water (MLD)
193.05 210.1 234 245 247 258 284
Total average daily water
discharge capacity (MLD)




122.39 133.2 172 184 185 131 137
Daily water consumption
through handposts (MLD)
12.79 12.75 6.5 6 3 3.5 3.5
Total average daily water
charged (MLD)
135.14 145.95 178.5 178 182 135 140.5
Percentage of water
unaccounted for
30 30.50 24 25 25 47 50.50
Daily water supply duration
(in hours)
12 13 12 13 12 10 10
Source: Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board.28
Now, consider the other two hypotheses posed, both
pertaining to receipts (income)—one that financial self-reliance does
not mean adequacy in service delivery; and that, those cities in which
user charges reflect the cost of providing the service are in a position
to provide better services, judged against certain benchmarks.
Figure 6 shows a comparison, across time periods, of LMC’s
revenues (in per capita constant 1997-98 prices). The figure
demonstrates some interesting aspects; there is a clear decline in the
total per capita revenues of the LMC in 2003-04, when compared to
2000-01. State transfers to LMC have continuously fallen since 1997-
98 and the LMC has been self-reliant, dependent heavily on octroi




However, own-revenue receipts in per capita terms have also
decreased in 2003-04, relative to their level in 2000-01. Income from
capital and other receipts has been negligible.
Table 9 shows the trend in proportion, water receipts have
formed of total expenditure and revenue expenditure on water. The
table shows that when total expenditure was taken into account,
water receipts covered only 50 percent a few years ago (in 2001-02)
but since has been declining. The situation is obviously much better
with revenue expenditure since there have been instances when
water receipts [(i.e., from user charges) have covered more than 90
Figure 6
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percent, but since 2000-01, that has also been declining. For the
financial year 2002-03, the total production cost of water (in dollar
(INR) per kilolitre)] excluding capital expenditure was $0.05 (INR
2.06) (including distribution losses), with revenue income per kilolitre
being only $0.02 (INR 0.92). As of 2002-03, revenue income covered
roughly only 45 percent of the total production cost of water (with or
without distribution losses).




as  percent of water
total expenditure











The story with regard to sewerage receipts is even worse,
since as of 2003-04, receipts from the service covered only one-third
of total expenditure, and a little over half of the revenue expenditure
(Table 10). Water and sewerage being basic services, their capital
expenditures cannot be covered through user charges, but for
financially sustainable service delivery, at least the O&M
expenditures should be covered. While our hypothesis implies that
capital expenditures should lead to better service delivery, in this
particular case, the decline in service levels of water supply and
sewerage need not be necessarily ‘caused’ by a decline in capital
expenditures, but they seem to be moving together.
Take the hypothesis that financial self-reliance does not
imply much for service delivery. First, note the financial
independence of the LMC has just meant reliance on octroi. Once
that is abolished, self-reliance might well become a myth. Note that
even the apparent financial independence has not resulted in an
adequate level of the service in this city. So it is a little difficult to
imagine what would happen to service levels in the aftermath of the
abolition of octroi, and in the midst of increasing demand for public
services, due to rising population density and continual in-migration.30

















Table 11 summarises the service level for sewerage in LMC.
It shows declining levels of population access to sewerage since
1999-00, when capital expenditure also started declining.
9
Further, over and above the relationship between financial
performance and service delivery, note that LMC’s pattern of
expenditure does not imply much for whether these services are
reaching the city’s poor. This is partly a result of the research design.
Note, however, that it is not an objective of this paper to examine the
equity of public service delivery, but to examine the reform of public
services overall. If public services cannot be improved overall
because of the city’s financial and/or institutional problems, there is
no way in which the poor can be favourably affected by better service
delivery. In fact, they would be more negatively affected in the event
that the city undergoes financial or institutional problems.
To definitively say something about the impact of the public
services on the poor, one would have to do some type of expenditure
tracking or get information (through a digitised spatial mapping
system) on the distribution of public services (such as water supply,
sewerage) and the location of poor, which, as has been discussed, is
outside the scope of the study. Given the caveats that there is no
data regarding the distribution of city’s income or spatial dispersion of31
Table 11: Sewerage Access over Time, LMC
Description 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Population access to
sewerage (in numbers)




437500 464000 680000 724500 649000 584860 585928
Population served through
soakage pits/ septic tanks
(in numbers)








100000 100000 250000 100000 10000 10000 10000
Actual number of sewer
connections




20 22 22 22 22 22 22
Total average daily
sewerage flow in MLD
300 310 351 400 400 267 292
Length of intercepting
sewer (in kilometer)
73.7 73.7 75 77 93 101 96
Length of lateral/branch
sewer (in kilometer)
569.28 710 724 743 797 903 964
Total length of sewer (in
kilometer)
642.98 783.7 799 820 890 1004 1098
Source: Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board.32
expenditure of the design, we noted the following (see framework
from the World Development Report, 2004).
• Poorer households have settled around the river and the outskirts of
the city, where the water channels have been laid already by the
LMC.
10
• Second, even if expenditure is increased in these poorer
neighborhoods, the question is whether that ensures better
service. That is, if the poorer households are getting water, is
that safe, potable water? This is a serious question, given that
many pollutants are being discharged into the river.
• Many a time, poorer households cannot afford the resources it
takes to gain access to these services. In Ludhiana, this lack of
demand appears to be the reason why poorer households in the
city’s periphery have been denied access to these service
networks.
5.5.1 Debt
The LMC floated a bond for $4.02 million (INR 178,000,000)
in 1999-2000, of which $2.22 million (INR 98,512,000) had been paid
towards interest, and $868,700 (INR 38,500,000) was expected to be
paid towards the principal as of January, 2005. The data on
repayment of loans in the water budget indicated that the repayment
increased from $67,690 (INR 3,000,000) in 1997-98 to $426,450
(INR 18,900,000) in 1999-2000, reflecting interest payments toward
this bond issue.
Apart from the bond issue, LMC had secured a loan from the
Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) for $4.4
million (INR 194,600,000) in 2001-02. The LMC has been making
repayment of this loan as well towards interest and principal
amounts. No separate repayment schedule was available from LMC
for the HUDCO loan. In 2003-04, LMC’s total repayment towards
loans jumped to $1.6 million (INR 73,000,000) in 2003-04 reflecting
payments towards HUDCO loan as well. In total, after repayments
have been accounted for, a sum of $10.4 million (or INR 460 million)
more ($6.25 million (INR 277 million) for the bond issue and roughly
$4.15 million (INR 183 million) for the HUDCO loan (principal plus
interest)) is required to retire the city’s debt.
A review of the LMC’s financial position thus indicates that
there is no room for complacency. It shows that the need for service
delivery reform in Ludhiana is financial as well, with the Government
of Punjab about to issue an ordinance to abolish octroi in the state.
Further, the city’s expenditures do not indicate commensurate33
increase in capital expenditure or developmental works to increase
the quantum or quality of public services. The LMC also has a
looming burden of public debt with onus of repayment.
VI. Roadblocks and Bottlenecks to Reform
The question arises as to why the financial and service
delivery performance in this city has been less than satisfactory,
when judged against national benchmarks set by India’s National
Commission on Urbanisation or the Zakaria Committee, and what are
the bottlenecks to better service delivery and reform.
6.1 Institutional Arrangements for Water and Sewerage
Services
Despite the importance of financial resources for reforming
service delivery, consider the final hypothesis that it is likely that
other factors such as institutional arrangements impact service
delivery. There are 17 state-level pieces of legislation and 23 pieces
of central legislation that affect the functioning of municipal areas in
Punjab. Among many other things, we identified a statutory overlap
of functions for planning, preparation and execution of water supply
and sewerage schemes with the PWSSB (PWSSB Act, 1976) that
also vests with the LMC (as per the Punjab Municipal Corporation
Act, 1976). As discussed earlier, the broad demarcation is that while
the PWSSB undertakes the planning, development and construction
of major water and sewer networks, the operation, maintenance and
the execution of minor developmental works is provided by the
municipality. This distinction does not, however, exist in the statute
(see, Table 12). Table 12 summarises the provisions of various acts
at the national, state and local level, their overlaps and implications.
The statutory overlap is a bottleneck as it creates
unnecessary confusion regarding the roles of the LMC and the
PWSSB in the execution of any given project. In reality, the
classification of a project as ‘major’ or ‘minor’ tends to become
arbitrary and the service takes a ‘passing the buck’ attitude.
Apart from the issue of statutory overlap, sometimes it is
desirable to have local autonomy in certain functional areas. It is
obvious that the LMC would be in a better position to judge, which
localities are served better, and those which would need
infrastructure upgradation or replacement.34
Table 12: Statutory Overlaps in Ludhiana and their Implications




Definition of urban areas, municipal areas and municipal
bodies, describing their composition and enlisting their
powers and function
1. District planning committees (DPC) to consolidate the
plans prepared by the panchayats and municipalities to
prepare a draft development plan for the district
The panchayats and
municipalities to prepare a
development plan but no
mention about the
unavailability of technical
expertise required to do so.
2. Urban planning including town planning, regulation of
landuse and planning for economic and social development
3. Services including water supply for domestic, industrial
and commercial purposes, public health, sanitation and
solid waste management
The service are included as
the functions and
responsibilities of the city
corporation, but no light on the
planning, implementing and
execution side of the services
4. Public ammenities i.e. Roads, Bridges street lighting,
parking lots and public convenience










6. Taxes, duties, tolls, fees and charges
Terms like “development
plan”, “social justice” and
“integrated development”
require clarity which is absent









controls which are to
be worked out later
will take a back seat,
the idea of integrated
development will be
lost.
1. The constitution of the municipal corporation delineation
of the powers, functions and appointment of the
commissioner.
2. The construction and maintenance of works and  means
for providing supply of water for public private purposes –
Obligatory Function.
Functions for planning,
preparation and execution of
water supply and sewerage
schemes also vests with the







pass the blame for
inefficient services.
3. The construction, maintenance and cleaning of drains
and drainage works and of public latrines, urinal and similar















4. The scavenging , removal and disposal of filth rubbish
and other obnoxious or polluted matter – Obligatory
Function
Detailed description of the
type of services provided
doesn’t mention any time
frame for the completion,
which results in delays.
The improvement
schemes take a




Table 12: Statutory Overlaps in Ludhiana and their Implications (contd.)




5. The construction, maintenance, alteration and
improvements of public streets, bridges and culverts–
Obligatory Function
6. The lighting, watering and cleansing of public streets and
other public places- Obligatory Function
7. The laying out or the maintenance of public parks, gardens
or recreation grounds – Obligatory Function
8. The improvement of the City in accordance with




are just a discretionary
function, its not surprising
that LMC doesn’t pay heed
to it and to the Ludhiana
Improvement Trust
1.  All improvement trusts to be under the administrative
control of department of local government.
2. Improvement and expansion of towns in the state and for
that purpose undertaking various types of improvement and
development schemes
“Improvement schemes”
have not been explained in
detail.  Improvements just by
beautification or
improvement by better
functioning?  The meaning









3. The Municipal Corporation shall pay to the Trust an amount
per annum equal to two percent of gross annual income
If the clause was put, then
suitably town improvement
schemes should have been
made the obligatory function
of the LMC
Since the activities




plus it doesn’t make
sense for another
authority to approve
it, who might not











1. Investigate and survey the requirements of water supply
and sewerage, prioritising water supply and sewerage
schemes with approval of the state government.
Functions for planning,
preparation and execution of
water supply and sewerage
schemes that also vests with








pass the blame for
inefficient services.36
Table 12: Statutory Overlaps in Ludhiana and their Implications (contd.)




2. Planning, preparing and executing schemes for the
purpose of providing supply of drinking water and sewerage
facilities in the areas of one or more local authorities.
Nothing specified in the act
pertaining to the working of
PWSSB as a contractor of
LMC for water and sewerage
works, which is the existing
system.
3. Laying down the norms of staff to be employed by a local
authority for maintenance of water supply and sewerage
works.
1. Establishment of PUDA, provisions for setting up special
authorities for particular areas and setting up of the new Town
Planning and Development
2. Provides legal sanctity for town planning and development
3. The highest decision making body for regional and town
planning is the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Board, set up under the act.
PUDA being a state wide
authority is not very effective
when it comes to city level
plans, which the TCP
prepares.  The act’s
weakness is not setting up a
separate development
authority for Ludhiana, which
would do all the planning
work.
4. Preparation of master plans and regional plans.
5. Development and regulation of landuse as per the plan.
Regional planning authority
not provided any powers to
rule over other authority












7. Provision of levy, assessment, and recovery development
charges.
No stress on the
implementation and
executing side of the master
plan.  No clasue stating the
implentating agencies and
stressing on the legal





disarray.  Plans not
even there on paper.37
The LMC, however, does not have the financial resources or
the technical expertise to execute water supply and sewerage
projects independently (which is presumably why the PWSSB is
currently entrusted with undertaking work of a capital nature). The
technical expertise is lacking, as the proportion of the city’s area
covered under regular employment is continually shrinking; the city
itself is expanding and retirements do keep occuring.
So what is desirable from an institutional perspective is not
readily feasible due to shortages of skills and resources at the local
level.
6.2  Institutional Arrangements for the City’s Landuse
Recall LMC’s high population density in relation to state and
national average (Figure 1), high traffic usage, and low land area in
relation to vehicle usage. Institutional arrangements for landuse in
Ludhiana is another example of service delivery failure (see Sridhar,
2006). The Punjab Town Improvement Act of 1922 provides for the
constitution of improvement trusts for improvement and expansion of
the towns in the state. In Ludhiana, the Ludhiana Improvement Trust
(LIT), is in principle, under the administrative control of the state’s
department of local government. The LIT is entrusted with the task of
proposing ways of improving the landuse of the city, and developing
new schemes for its development. However, the problem is that city
improvement is the LMC’s discretionary not obligatory powers, under
the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976.
The Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development
Act was enacted in 1995, requiring a planning agency for the
preparation of Master Plans for cities, and their enforcement.  In
Ludhiana, the town and city planning department (TCP) prepares a
plan in consultation with the Punjab Urban Development Authority
(PUDA), which is approved by the state’s department of local
government. The Punjab Urban Development Authority set up under
the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, is a
state-wide authority. As may be clear, because of its centralised
nature, it is not effective in local planning.
While it is accepted that the TCP or the LIT are in a much
better position to plan for the city’s development and its
infrastructure, it is not clear what the separate roles of the TCP and
LIT are in city planning and improvement. This results in a situation of
‘passing the buck’ when it comes to removal of ‘illegal’
encroachments on public land. Recall that Ludhiana has a large slum38
population, compared with other cities of the same size. The role of
the private sector in land development is confined to the developers
that buy plots from the LIT.
The Punjab Town Improvement Trust Act, 1922, Section 67,
Chapter 7, provides that “..the Municipal Committee shall pay to the
Trust….an amount per annum equal to two percent of the gross
annual income of such Committee.” According to this, the LMC owes
the LIT 2 percent of its gross receipts every year, which the LMC
stopped paying to the Trust in 1974, cumulatively adding up to $10.4
million (INR 460,000,000) as of the current financial year. The fact
that the LMC has not paid the due 2 percent of its revenue to the LIT
is apparently because LIT’s contribution to development schemes of
the city is not clear.
To the LIT, the lack of payment from the LMC of its due
share affected its task negatively. As long as it was getting its due
share from the LMC, the LIT, in fact, had developed several housing
schemes that were handed over to the municipality in 1973 (see,
Table 13).
Subsequently, owing to non-payment of dues by the LMC,
the LIT had not been able to develop new schemes, because of the
lack of a resource base. LIT even had some cases pending in the
court over the compensation to be paid for land acquired several
years ago. LIT does make some money through sale of its schemes
to developers. While residential plots are sold by lottery, commercial
plots are sold by auction to the highest bidder.
11 The LIT is currently
working with four schemes (see, Table 13) through these revenue
sources and bank loans.
The proliferation of institutions for landuse in this city is,
however, by no means, isolated. Experience from cities in other
countries is similar. As Sridhar (2006) highlights, the Royal Town
Planning Institute in Ireland (2001) documents a similar experience
regarding institutional arrangements for landuse and transport in the
Greater Dublin area, which highlights the urgent need for integration
of planning and delivery of urban development. Auzins (2004)
documents a similar set of common problems faced by the central
and east European countries in their land management processes
primarily because of conflicting legislation.39
Table 13: Schemes, Ludhiana Improvement Trust
List of Schemes transferred to Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana u/s 55 of P.T.I Act 1922
No Name of Schemes Area in Acres Landuse Date of Transfer to LMC
1 Tagore Nagar Part I 6.00 Residential 11-09-70
2 Tagore Nagar Extension Part I 2.00 Res.cum comm. 11-09-70
3 Shaheed Udham Singh Nagar 33.35 -do- 01-11-71
4 Moti Nagar 22.72 -do- 12-03-85
5 Islam Ganj including Kidwai Nagar 34.50 Housing cum comm. 24-04-73
6 Shaheed Kartar S. Sarbha Nagar 287.00 Res. cum comm. 01-07-73
7 Dr. Saifudin Kitchlu Nagar 100.00 -do- 12-03-85
8 24 Acre Division Scheme 24.00 Residential 12-03-86
9 Model Town Extension Part II 146.28 -do- 05-06-85
10 5.53 acre Scheme on Sheep Shank Road 5.53 Housing 18-09-85
11 Bhadur House 3.50 Commercial 12-03-85
12 Lajpat Rai Market 0.44 -do- --
13 Jawahar Nagar Market 0.50 -do- --
14 Feroze Gandhi Market 13.00 -do- 12-03-85
15 Truck Stand 114.00 -do- 12-03-86
16 Grain Market 62.00 -do- Handed over to Punjab
Mandi Board
17 Dairy Scheme (Tajpur Road) 45.00 -do- 12-03-85
18 Cycle Market 2.62 -do- --40
Table 13: Schemes, Ludhiana Improvement Trust (contd.,)
List of Schemes transferred to Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana u/s 55 of P.T.I Act 1922
No. Name of Schemes Area in Acres Landuse Date of Transfer to LMC
19 Ind. Area Ext. a Scheme 64.24 Industrial --
20 Bhai Randhir Singh Nagar 550.00 Residential 01-08-94
21 Model Town Extension 400.00 Residential 01-08-94
22 Gian Singh Rarawala Market 6.00 Res. cum comm. 01-08-94
23 Dashmesh Nagar 4.00 Housing 01-08-94
Current Schemes with the Trust
1 Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar
2 Maharshi Bahmik Nagar
3 Rajguru Nagar
4 Sant Ishel Singh Nagar41
Clearly, local bodies everywhere have a problem with
integrating policy making and implementation. Based on the
instances of water supply and landuse, we find conclusive evidence
for the hypothesis that, in addition to the finances, institutional
arrangements negatively impact service delivery in this city.
6.3  Inability to Increase User Charges for Services
The absence of appropriate user charges is an impediment
to the effective delivery of services (see, Reedy, 1986), consistent
with our hypothesis and corroborated by LMC revenues from water
and sewerage. A municipal corporation’s finances are closely related
to the various user charges and other revenue sources that
determine the levels and quality of service delivery, as also
highlighted by Fox and Edmiston (2000). In India as well, the MUD
and JNNURM have also been trying to support a commercial
orientation as a financially sustainable approach to service delivery.
Over and above the issue of user charges not adequately
covering production costs, the LMC provides public services to
unauthorised slums that are not payers of property taxes. There is a
need for raising water and other service charges, although in a
phased manner, for both domestic and commercial users, if an
attempt is made to relate water quality to the user charge, consumer
willingness to pay might be forthcoming.
6.4 Quality of Services
In the case of water, the city is faced with the problem of
quality. Landuse has important effects on the delivery of
water/sanitation, given that the main source of water supply in the
city is underground water. Heterogeneous landuses are spread
through the city; because of this, industry in the city is spatially
dispersed. If industrial use had been spatially concentrated, it would
have been feasible for a single sewage treatment plant to be set up
for the effluents of all industrial units. However, given the spatial
dispersion of industry, and the lack of a sewage treatment plant, most
of the small units discharge their waste water and sewage into the
open drains that enter the local stream, whose contamination has
affected the ground water quality. This is causing a serious
environmental sanitation hazard and the stream has become a virtual
drain.
For solving this problem, the GoI has initiated the Sutlej river
conservation plan. This project (Sutlej Action Plan (SAP)) has been42
formulated to prevent pollution of the river and to improve its water
quality. However, it is obvious that SAP is a short-term solution which
treats the outcome, rather than the cause of the problem. The long-
run solution is to encourage the spatial concentration of industry,
through better zoning and implementation of the comprehensive plan.
Zoning and comprehensive planning facilitate the regulation of
landuse and pollution and make them spatially concentrated.
Currently however, a laissez-faire approach has been adopted to city
planning with the result that service quality is not monitored.
VII. Triggers for Reform
Crises do trigger reforms, as in the case of the balance of
payments crisis of 1991 that made India adopt the path of reform.
There are some triggers that could make the reform happen in LMC.
These are:
7.1 Abolition of Octroi and Financial Resources
As our findings with respect to finances confirm, pre-existing
financial resources are a crucial factor that determine the internal
readiness for reforming public service delivery in most cities. A city
with a large financial base and buoyant revenue sources (such as an
appropriately designed property tax) need not reform its service
delivery, as it is presumably in a position to offer an
acceptable/adequate level of services, judged against benchmarks.
Heavily as the LMC’s finances are dependent on octroi, the
Government of Punjab might issue an ordinance any time in the near
future to abolish octroi in the state. Given the fact that octroi accounts
for more than 70 percent of LMC’s own source revenues, surely the
abolition will come as a trigger to persuade LMC to be financially
more responsible. Some ways of making the LMC more financially
responsible would be to bring into the tax net those residential
properties that have remained exempt.
12 Further, our discussions
indicated that there are frequent under-assessments in the city of
taxed (commercial or business) property that range anywhere from 2-
20 times of their reported value.
  While not possible completely, one way to compensate for
octroi abolition could be to increase water charges, by disseminating
information regarding the user charge and quality relationship, which43
could appeal to the public because of the questionable water quality
in the LMC area. For instance, if water charges were to be raised and
were used to finance the setting up of a second sewerage treatment
(in addition to the one envisaged under the SAP), residents would be
willing to pay more to get safe, potable water. Further, the LMC
provides services to unauthorised slums that are not payers of
property taxes. Provision of service upon payment is the sustainable
option for better service delivery. This is consistent with what the
literature finds with respect to developing countries [example, Fox
and Edmiston (2000); Reedy (1986)], and with respect to India
(Sridhar, Mathur, and Nandy, 2006).
  If octroi were to be abolished, the state Government of
Punjab will most likely come up with a compensation package for the
local government. While our financial analysis indicates that transfers
have not been important in the LMC context, with octroi abolition,
they could well become very important in the transition period. If this
were to happen, octroi abolition might not act as a trigger to make
LMC more financially accountable and reform service delivery.
Other triggers in finances that could bring about reform in
service delivery would be if property records were properly
maintained by the city. In the past, lost records have meant litigation,
court cases, and significant financial losses to the city. This could be
attained with e-governance initiatives, in the steps of states like
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh that have successfully computerised
all their land records, making them accessible, transparent, and
accountable.
7.2  Privatisation in Service Delivery
As is clear, the LMC (or the PWSSB, both being public or
para-public entities) is the lead service provider of public services in
most instances. The Ludhiana case demonstrates a different variant
of the client-policymaker-service provider relationship highlighted by
World Development Report (WDR) 2004. In the LMC, the
policymaker is also the service provider in most instances and is
directly accountable to the clients (public). Service delivery then
depends on the motivation of the public sector entity in providing the
service, implying not much discipline for public provision of the
service.
It has been often said that privatisation is the panacea for a
variety of problems in service delivery. While private participation in
the provision of public services is limited in Ludhiana as should be44
clear from the institutional arrangements to provide water supply, for
example, note the private sector or contractors cannot move into a
vacuum created by a total collapse of the public sector. The
experience with the private sector world-wide has shown that,
wherever governance is weak, privatisation of the essential water
and sanitation services results in serious problems including raising
costs and reducing access and quality for the less well-off (see also
WDR, 2004). This suggests that strong governance that can regulate
as well as enable public participation in decision-making and project
formulation, can facilitate private sector participation, reduce cost of
access and improve quality. So, public-private partnerships can work
only if public sector governance is strong. Given strong public sector
governance, privatisation stimulates efficiency because it ties
performance to remuneration.
Take the example of water supply. As is clear, it is quite
feasible to outsource the running of tubewells that is known to be a
technically simple and not a very time consuming job. In many
instances, as in the past, in the LMC, private tubewell operators have
included individual shopkeepers, housewives, or senior citizens, in
return for a small amount of remuneration. Compare this to the
relatively higher salaries to government employees as tubewell
operators in return for the usually poor level of services offered by
them (for e.g., they do attend to repairs, but only with some time
delay). Thus outsourcing is certainly welcome and will act as a trigger
of change and better service. In addition to the monetary savings,
outsourcing can bring about the much needed diversity in skills for
service delivery. As is the case everywhere, the LMC has been
unable to attract the skills required for executing various jobs. Even if
available, they tend to be scarce because of various reasons: one is
the monetary cost associated with their recruitment for the LMC. A
second reason is the constant spatial expansion of the LMC that
requires increasing number of employees to ensure service
coverage. Because of these reasons, privatisation or even mere
outsourcing can act as a trigger for financial and institutional reform
in LMC.
Outsourcing has been introduced by the LMC in the running
of tubewells, disposal works, and desilting of sewers. Currently, a
large number of tubewells (240 out of 350) have been entrusted by
LMC to private operators for operation and maintenance. The work of
desilting interceptor sewers was given on contract by LMC during
1996-97, all steps in the right direction toward reforming these
services, assuming LMC oversight.45
7.3 Public Participation
Where accountability or public participation exist, there,
service delivery is likely to be successful. The question is: do
mechanisms or forum exist for grievance redressal and information
sharing in the city? There are no NGOs or consumer organisations
that deal with public service delivery issues in the city. The
outsourcing of tubewell operations is an example of attempts to
involve citizens in the delivery of public services. Although public
services and their delivery/effectiveness are debated among the
elitist groups of the city, there is no systematic discourse on the
delivery of various services.
The media can do much to disseminate information and
improve local government performance in public service delivery.
Despite the city’s above average literacy, we found that total
newspaper circulation and readership in Ludhiana (of 65,700)
covered only one-fourth of the city’s households in 2001. Given the
apparent lack of information to a substantial portion of the city’s
households, it is not clear what the incentives are for the
policymaker-cum-service provider (the LMC/PWSSB) to be
accountable to the public.
Currently a major problem with LMC functioning is the lack of
public participation or discourse in budgeting. Ludhiana is
conspicuous by its absence of NGOs working in the public service
areas (compare this with drinking water as an area where SEWA,
(Self-employed Women’s Association) women have taken the lead in
the western Indian state of Gujarat, India, for example.
The Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore, India, did several
rounds of surveys to come up with periodic report cards on various
services, and rated various public service agencies in Bangalore. The
Public Affairs Centre subsequently prepared report cards on services
in six other large Indian cities, mostly in partnership with NGOs and
local civic groups that are interested in taking follow-up action. There
are report cards also on specialised services such as hospitals and
public transport. But in all cases, report cards have been used as a
trigger for collective action by citizens and as a stimulus to get public
agencies to respond.
Certainly, better information to the public and their
participation in the provision of various services is likely to act as a
rapid trigger for reform. Some initiatives here could be to enable web-46
presence of LMC budgets, its priorities and public discourse
regarding the various problems associated with service delivery.
7.4 Master Plan
Providing statutory status to the current master plan will
provide signals regarding its mandatory nature, and is likely to act as
a trigger for bringing about landuse reform in the city. This would
ensure balanced allocation of resources to landuses that need them
the most and also plan for the city’s future development in a
systematic manner (see for instance, Sridhar, 2005). Further, as
discussed earlier, spatial concentration of industry would have
advantages for efficient sewerage disposal. Finally, a comprehensive
plan would enable the better estimation of demand for various
services in different parts of the city, and the planning of
infrastructure. Such enforcement would trigger a process that would
narrow the demand-supply gap in the delivery and quality of water
and sewerage services, traffic, and transportation management.
7.5 Local Autonomy
Decentralisation is known to promote better service delivery,
accountability to citizens, and economic efficiency. While centralised
systems have become less credible, decentralisation has now
become a world-wide phenomenon, not just confined to India, but
many emerging and new economies in East Asia, Latin America and
Europe. Currently, in many countries, institutional arrangements
impinge on the ability of the local government to influence policy
pertaining to the development of water, sewerage, and landuse. It
may be recalled that in the case of Ludhiana, the PWSSB and LMC
are both actors in the water and sewerage sectors. Whereas in the
case of landuse, the LMC and LIT are both actors, which is also the
reason why LIT is not in a financially good position, having been
denied its share from LMC revenues. Autonomy to these local
government departments, with adequate financial and capacity
building support in the initial stages, will trigger a process of
institutional reform.
This certainly implies that the PWSSB should not interfere
with the development, planning of water supply and sewerage in the
LMC, honoring the LMC’s responsibility accorded by the Punjab
Municipal Corporation Act, since local autonomy is desirable in
projects of a local nature. To facilitate this, initially at least, the
PWSSB should extend logistic and technical support to the LMC to
facilitate and speed up the process of local autonomy. At the47
minimum, basic service responsibilities (e.g., construction vis-à-vis
O&M work) have to be sorted. Specific gaps such as lack of technical
expertise at the LMC are typically outsourced so that private services
are effectively utilised.  Further, in the case of landuse, the LIT has
specific investment needs, which if given autonomy in city
development and its due share in the city’s financial resources, can
act as the trigger for landuse improvements in the city, much needed.
VIII.   Summary of Findings and Concluding Remarks
Overall, this paper addresses the need for reforming urban
service delivery; the relationship between finances and service
delivery, any potential bottlenecks, and triggers for reforming service
delivery in urban areas, taking the case of Ludhiana, India, as an
example. The actual state of various services and several basic
measures that we examine (growth of population density, traffic vis-à-
vis road density, composition of landuse, service delivery and current
finances, including debt) suggest a need for financial as well as
institutional reform in Ludhiana. These observations continue to be
valid even when we project some indicators under various
assumptions. Besides, in the case of this city, we find a positive
relationship between capital expenditure and service delivery
specifically as they relate to water supply and sewerage, consistent
with our hypotheses. Further, we find support for our other
hypotheses that user charges and service delivery are related, and
that financial self-reliance does not imply adequacy of the service
level. In addition to financial constraints, we find conclusive evidence
that the major bottlenecks to reforming service delivery are
institutional, and pertain to existing arrangements for water,
sewerage, and landuse.
The major lessons and triggers that could make the reform
happen in the LMC and other cities are clarifications in institutional
arrangements for service delivery, encouraging privatisation in
service delivery and public participation, and sustainable finances,
with spending on capital expenditure, supported by user charges.
Our study suggests that problems with institutional arrangements are
not a local phenomenon confined merely to Ludhiana, India. As we
have reviewed here, fixing institutional arrangements for the provision
of local public services go a long way in improving service delivery at
the local level everywhere. Further, proactive public participation,
privatisation of required services along with needed oversight, and
the requisite spending on capital work, certainly are likely to make48
public authorities everywhere more accountable to the public and
reform service delivery.
Similar experiences worldwide mean that local bodies
everywhere have a problem with integrating policy making and
implementation. As this case study demonstrates, policy and action
coherence is as vital for effective financial management as it is for
service delivery. India’s 74
th Constitutional Amendment Act formally
recognised local governments as the third tier of government more
than 13 years ago, but that has not affected their internal functioning.
This case demonstrates the need to identify an umbrella agency from
among the numerous existing agencies, which can oversee various
aspects of planning in cities for better management of finances and
reforming the delivery of services, for true local autonomy, and better
public participation in city planning not only in India, but in all
emerging and new economies in East Asia, Latin America, and
Europe, where decentralisation has taken place.51
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Endnotes
                                                       
1 These data are for urban areas in the country. It is possible that analogous,
if not worse, problems exist in the rural areas regarding which reliable data
are not available. However, if urbanisation is an inevitable occurrence, it is
important to address these infrastructure problems in the urban areas. If
such problems cannot be addressed in the urban areas, it would be much
more difficult to address them in the rural areas!
2 This and all other monetary data in this paper are based on the exchange
rate US$1 = INR 44.32, reported by the Reserve Bank of India on October
10, 2005.
3 At the time work for this case study was completed, similar data were not
yet available from the 2001 census.
4 We attempted to get this data for Ludhiana Municipal Corporation (LMC) as
well, only to find that the LMC limits contain only 10-15 percent of units in the
area. Hence we report the district-level rather than the city-level data here.
5 We attempted, but were unable to find data on any other measures of the
city’s contribution to state economic activity such as its contribution to the
state’s GDP.
6 Analogous 2001 data were not yet available from the Census of India at the
time this work was completed.
7 The Census of India defines class I cities as those with population
>100,000.
8 Octroi is a tax levied on business activity, being a tax on the entry of goods
into a municipal area for consumption, or sale. Most Indian states (except
municipal corporations in Maharashtra, Gujarat, and cities in Punjab) have
now abolished the octroi that is known to be a highly distortionary tax. As
Rao, Pradhan, and Bohra (1985) point out, there are several reasons as to
why octroi is distortionary in its effects. Production losses occur due to
hindrances to smooth traffic flow. Next, time delays do invariably occur at
checkposts and give rise to arbitrariness and corruption. The tax is
subjectively assessed being based on trust rather than on actual books of
accounts. Further, efficiency losses occur because of taxation of inputs and
capital goods. The same goods are taxed at multiple points in different
municipalities. Finally, the cost of collection is high.
9 Note that there is no anomaly in a decline in the number of persons having
access to sewerage. In most cities, a sewer connection installed in violation
of procedures predetermined by the service provider, is usually treated as
unauthorised, and is likely to be disconnected without notice. For instance,
see the Delhi Jal Board’s website, http://www.delhijalboard.nic.in/.
10 This finding is based on a visual, and crude examination of a map of
LMC’s water channels and that of the city.50
                                                                                                                     
11 
In a major controversy on land allotment, in May 2005, allegations
surfaced over nearly 27 acres of prime land for developing a city centre at
the heart of Ludhiana, awarded by the LIT through a tender process
estimated to be worth $112,815,884 (INR 5,000,000,000). It was alleged that
both the technical and financial eligibility criteria was overlooked by the LIT,
in the case of the successful bidder, among the six leading developers who
had put in bids for the project.
12 Movement towards taxation of residential property involves transaction
costs such as the identification of properties, their valuation, setting tax rates,
revenue collection, and other compliance costs, that are not the focus of this
paper.